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Planting Seeds of Order: How the State Can Create, 
Shape, and Use Customary Law 
 
Bryan H. Druzin 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper argues that government can strategically trigger the emer-
gence of customary law in order to achieve specific policy ends. While much 
has been written on customary law, the idea that the State can stimulate its 
emergence is a radical notion with clear policy implications. Harnessed cor-
rectly, such an approach could be a powerful legislative weapon to create, sus-
tain, and even redirect social order. Building upon basic insights from game 
theory, the paper posits a way to do this: policymakers can deliberately recreate 
the social conditions that foster the emergence of customary order. The paper, 
however, draws a sharp divide between the technical and the normative. After 
laying out how this may technically be achieved, the paper considers the nor-
mative legitimacy of this kind of socio-legal engineering, concluding that, 
while it may be theoretically possible to trigger the emergence of customary 
law, the normative implications of doing so are quite another matter, and as 
such it is difficult to see how such policies could ever be casually pursued. 
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Introduction 
If we take law to mean the rules that structure society, then law is 
not a purely legislative creation. At best, codified law is but the formal 
tip of a colossal iceberg, the sublimation of an organic, social occur-
rence—a natural phenomenon comparable to the crystalline structure 
of a snowflake or the rippling patterns of water in a still lake.1 Indeed, 
most social order is not created by the State. There exists a vast ocean 
of social rules completely untouched by formal law. The machinery of 
government stays well clear of most existing social order, electing to 
concern itself with only a small sliver of it. This natural social ordering, 
comprising of norms and customary rules, has been referred to as “bot-
tom-up law.”2 Bottom-up law stands in contrast to “top-down law.” 
That is, legal order created and imposed by the State.3 Probably more 
familiar to the reader is the term “customary law,” which captures this 
concept of bottom-up social order, particularly when it has crystallized 
 
 1.  In fact, the need to artificially create legal order through some central law-making 
authority employing coercion can be understood as a sign of the natural processes of social order 
failing. As Lon Fuller points out, in its ideal form, legal order “works so smoothly that there is 
never any occasion to resort to force or the threat of force to effectuate its norms.” LON L. 
FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 221 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981). 
 2.  See Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947 (1997). 
As Cooter explains elsewhere, “Rather than proceeding from the top to bottom, lawmaking can 
proceed from bottom to top.” Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Mer-
chant: A Model of Decentralised Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 215 (1994). The term has 
also been used by some to mean law-making by sub-state organizations. See, e.g., BALAKRISHNAN 
RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENTS, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003); LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW (Boaven-
tura De Sousa Santos & Cèsar A. Rodriguez-Garavito eds., 2005); JORDAN J. PAUST, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 21 n.10 (2003). It is used here, how-
ever, in a far more fundamental sense: the level of individual actors working together in decen-
tralized coordination. Here I am in agreement with Posner. See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, 
and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1700 (1996) (discounting as bottom-up norms 
“the rules self-consciously formulated and issued by private institutions, such as trade associa-
tions”). 
 3.  As the reader will see, I use the term “legal order” here much more broadly than 
simply in the sense of that created by the State. In this paper, “legal order” is used to describe 
any system where parties follow a collectively-recognized set of rules. Thus, this includes the 
“rules” of customs and norms. When the term “law” is used here, it is meant as also encompassing 
this species of informal regulation—it is law not merely in the formal judicial sense, but also the 
broad regulatory sense, even without any authoritative pronouncement or formal enforcement 
of these rules. Indeed, a very expansive view of “law” is embraced here. Some may take issue with 
such a loose definition, but the skeptical reader is urged to read on. 
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into an easily-identifiable body of rules (I will use this term hence-
forth).4 Throughout most of human history, custom, more than any 
other force, has preserved social order.5 This brings up a very interest-
ing possibility: what if the energy of customary law could be tapped 
into? What if we could strategically harness the force of customary law 
to serve the specific ends of policy makers? 
H.L.A. Hart observed that customs arise whereas laws are made.6 
From this, he concluded it is thus impossible for the emergence of cus-
tom to ever come under anyone’s rational control and, as a conse-
quence, custom could never serve the ends of policymakers.7 Hart, this 
paper argues, is dead wrong. It may in fact be quite possible for custom 
to serve the interests of policymakers. Embracing this notion, this pa-
per considers a somewhat radical proposition. The idea posited here is 
that government may deliberately stimulate the emergence of custom-
ary order by, in effect, planting seeds of order that will “grow” such 
order.8 The idea is that if the conditions that give rise to bottom-up 
customary order can be sufficiently identified, policymakers can stra-
tegically recreate these conditions, triggering its emergence in a con-
trolled manner. Within the law and norms literature, the idea that cus-
tomary norms9 can be used to alter mass social behavior, such as 
 
 4.  Throughout the paper, I use the term “customary law” in a very loose sense. In a more 
formal sense, two elements are required for the emergence of binding customary law: “(1) the 
practice should emerge out of the spontaneous and uncoerced behaviour of various members of 
a group, and (2) the parties involved must subjectively believe in the obligatory or necessary na-
ture of the emerging practice (opinio iuris).” Francesco Parisi, Spontaneous Emergence of Law: Cus-
tomary Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 603, 606 (2000). Here these criteria 
are relaxed slightly. For example, in the definition of customary law proffered here informal co-
ercion may be operative. Additionally, it is not necessary that every social rule be perfectly inter-
nalized (opinio juris). Also, I have in mind here a grass-roots customary ordering on the micro-
level of individual actors as opposed to grand customary systems on, for example, a national or 
even international level. 
 5.  AMANDA PERREAU-SAUSSINE & JAMES B. MURPHY, THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY 
LAW: LEGAL, HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 158 (2007). 
 6.  H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89–96 (1961). 
 7.  See id. 
 8.  This is quite an ironic proposal considering that bottom-up law is typically invoked 
by theorists of a libertarian persuasion to advocate for less centralized engineering, not more. 
 9.  Note that I use the terms customary norms and social norms interchangeably. I like-
wise use the terms customary law and customary order more or less synonymously. 
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recycling, tax evasion, or smoking, has engendered a fair degree of op-
timism. This scholarship, the New Chicago School as it is called,10 syn-
thesizes economic insights with basic sociological inquiry,11 examining 
law’s powerful role in the formation of social norms.12 Scholars who 
have advocated this approach include prominent theorists such as Law-
rence Lessig, Cass Sunstein, and Dan Kahan.13 The New Chicago 
School essentially offers four methods of influencing customary 
norms: (1) information campaigns to trigger widespread belief in the 
norm’s legitimacy; (2) increasing the esteem (or the guilt) felt in fol-
lowing a norm by altering social perceptions; (3) mandating or banning 
a particular behavior; and (4) taxing or subsidizing behaviors.14 The 
present thesis offers a fifth method. Yet the idea posited here is a far 
more expansive concept: it not only offers a technique to shape specific 
norms, it envisions the wholesale triggering of fairly complex systems 
of customary order.15 
How? While the details are somewhat technical, in a nutshell it is 
this: it is well understood in game theory, as well as in sociology more 
generally, that repeated interaction tends to stimulate bottom-up or-
der.16 It is for this reason that customary order tends to arise so ro-
bustly in small groups. Given that repeated interaction tends to give 
 
 10.  See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998). 
 11.  Id. at 661. 
 12.  Ryan Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms, and Social 
Panoptics, 89 CAL. L. REV. 643, 643 (2001). 
 13.  See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 10; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 
VA. L. REV. 349 (1997). See also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation 
of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 346–47 (1997). But see ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL 
NORMS (2000) (cautioning against such approaches). “Norm management” is discussed again 
below. See infra Part III.D. 
 14.  For a good overview of norm management techniques, see Ann E. Carlson, Recycling 
Norms, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1231, 1250–52 (2001). 
 15.  Even if the present thesis is incorrectly lumped in with the “norm management liter-
ature,” it represents an entirely fresh approach to the issue and is, even in this limited sense, a 
useful contribution to the literature. 
 16.  Much of the game theory literature addresses the principle of repeated interaction in 
the context of iterated games which solves the prisoner’s dilemma. The economics literature 
alone is very large but I refer the reader to the foundational work regarding this idea: see Robert 
Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation 211 SCI. 1390 (1981); Robert Ax-
elrod, The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 306 (1981). See also 
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991) (citing the emergence and enforcement 
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rise to customary order, the trick is simply to recreate the conditions 
that produce repeated interaction. Understanding this, the State can 
induce the emergence of customary law by yoking actors together into 
relationships of repeated interaction through establishing legal obliga-
tions between them that will ensure this repetition. Lawmakers can use 
ongoing positive legal duties (duties that require overt positive actions 
between actors) to create clusters of people who repeatedly interact, 
mimicking the conditions of a small group and in turn stimulating the 
emergence of customary order.17 In this way, a little well-crafted top-
down law can potentially stimulate a cascade of highly structured, com-
plex bottom-up law. This offers several, very compelling advantages. 
Because it arises from an active discourse between parties, customary 
law is often more efficient.18 Customary law is also often more robust, 
pragmatic, internalized,19 and even self-enforcing.20 Where the rules 
prove self-enforcing, the enforcement burden on the State may be dra-
matically lightened. In many areas, the cost of monitoring and enforc-
ing top-down legal order may be prohibitively high or may raise pri-
vacy concerns. Of particular use, however, is that because this social 
order may be deliberately engineered, policymakers can grow custom-
ary order in directions that reinforce public policy objectives. Indeed, 
 
of norms among cattle ranchers in Shasta county); see also, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the 
Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 
(1992); Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous Middleman Group: An Institutional 
Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981); Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social 
Change: The Semi-autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
719 (1973). 
 17.  It has been argued that the traditional norm management literature has been overly-
optimistic in its claims that social norms can actually change behavior. While social norms may 
work well for small groups, these methods stumble in relation to large-number, small-payoff col-
lective action problems. See Carlson, supra note 14, at 1233–34. The strategy of fostering cus-
tomary order through recreating a small group dynamic thus offers itself as an attractive alterna-
tive to the norm management strategies proposed by this literature. 
 18.  Parisi, supra note 4, at 611–12. 
 19.  That is, participants feel emotionally obliged to observe these norms. As Eric Posner 
says, “people bound by [norms] feel an emotional or psychological compulsion to obey the norms; 
norms have moral force.” Posner, supra note 2, at 1709. Internationalization is arguably the most 
socially powerful component of custom, yet for the purposes of this paper, it is simply noted then 
mostly set aside. However, I deal with normative internalization in great depth elsewhere. See 
Bryan Druzin, Law, Selfishness, and Signals: An Expansion of Posner’s Signaling Theory of Social 
Norms, 24 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 5 (2011) (explaining norm internalization as an evolutionary trait). 
 20.  Parisi, supra note 4, at 611. 
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if policymakers can figure out a way to trigger the emergence of cus-
tomary law, this strategy would provide the State with a valuable 
weapon in its legislative arsenal to create, sustain, and even redirect 
social order. Proving Hart wrong, custom could obediently serve the 
ends of policymakers. 
While much has been written on how the State should incorporate 
customary law, the idea that the State can actually trigger its emer-
gence is a somewhat radical notion. Many may find the idea of inten-
tionally channeling the emergence of customary order to serve the pol-
icy interests of the State slightly chilling—a grossly paternalistic, if not 
frighteningly authoritarian form of social engineering.21 This being 
the case, and lest I be accused of harboring closeted, fascist impulses, 
the paper draws a sharp divide between the technical and the norma-
tive. After descriptively mapping out how the State may trigger cus-
tomary law on a technical level, the paper offers a critique of the nor-
mative legitimacy of this kind of socio-legal engineering. Ultimately, 
the purpose of the paper is simply to show that it is theoretically pos-
sible to trigger customary law. The normative implications of doing so 
are quite another matter. 
The discussion that follows is highly theoretical, drawing on basic 
concepts from game theory. For the reader unfamiliar with game the-
ory, I have attempted to avoid an overly technical analysis. While to 
make my case, a little technical nitty-gritty is unavoidable, every at-
tempt is made to keep the argument as straightforward as possible. 
Technical points are relegated to footnotes wherever possible. The 
main problem is that the paper lands us in uncharted theoretical terri-
tory. Short of actual experimentation, the validity of the idea will re-
main an open question. As such, the argument would benefit enor-
mously from research of an empirical nature. Such research is invited. 
I develop my argument in three parts in the following manner. Part 
I discusses how repeated interaction tends to induce customary order. 
 
 21.  Social engineering is understood as the shaping of popular attitudes, social behaviors, 
and resource management on a large scale. For early treatments of the concept, see EDWIN L. 
EARP, THE SOCIAL ENGINEER (1911), as well as KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND 
ITS ENEMIES 147–157 (2012 [1945]). 
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Part II then proposes a model of how to trigger customary order, ar-
guing that the State can craft positive legal duties to create relation-
ships of repeated interaction and thereby trigger the emergence of cus-
tomary law. The emergence of customary commercial law is then 
offered as an example of the ability of positive duties to trigger cus-
tomary order. Part III then adopts an entirely different analytical tack 
and examines the normative implications of cultivating customary law, 
arguing that while such a strategy may indeed be technically viable, it 
runs counter to the fundamental principles undergirding a liberal dem-
ocratic society, and as such it is difficult to see how such policies could 
ever be casually pursued. 
I. Why Customary Law Tends to Emerge in Small 
Groups: Game Theory Gives Us an Answer 
In this section I discuss the tendency of customary law to emerge 
in small groups, examining first the critical role that repeated interac-
tion plays in this process. I then look at the informal mechanisms that 
help sustain customary order once arisen. I then discuss how large 
groups, on a structural level, tend to inhibit the emergence of cooper-
ative order. 
A. Repeated Interaction Tends to Produce Order 
Customary order can emerge quite robustly in small groups.22 Re-
search shows that the reason for this is bound up with the fact that 
members are repeatedly interacting: any situation where there is suffi-
cient repetition between the same actors can generate degrees of stable 
 
 22.  See Robert Cooter, The Law and Economics of Anthropology, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 719, 723 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (refer-
encing much of the literature that supports this). See also PETER OREBECH, THE ROLE OF 
CUSTOMARY LAW IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 371 (2005); Carlson, supra note 14, at 1245. 
See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
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social order.23 Game theorists have long noted the importance of re-
peated interaction in inducing social cooperation.24 Crucially, where 
there is sustained cooperation, a coherent body of rules is sure to 
emerge. Repeated interactions between people can generate all sorts 
of relatively stable self-ordering arrangements.25 This is true in many 
social dynamics captured in game theory.26 Games with inefficient so-
lutions, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, often suddenly produce effi-
cient solutions when repeated with the same players.27 Repetition, for 
the most part, solves the social dilemmas that stand in the way of self-
sustaining cooperative order.28 This insight has become virtually axio-
matic among game theorists: “One-shot encounters encourage defec-
tion; frequent repetition encourages cooperation.”29 Analyses of iter-
ated games suggest “the general idea that social norms emerge 
endogenously in recurrent dilemma situations if the population is a 
close-knit community.”30 As Robert Ellickson contends, small groups 
of “[p]eople who repeatedly interact can generate [legal] institutions 
through communication, monitoring, and sanctioning.”31 This is be-
 
 23.  This idea has been extensively studied. The foundational work here is Robert Axelrod 
& William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 SCI. 1390 (1981). But see MATT 
RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
COOPERATION 65 (1997); LEADING EDGES IN SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 222 (R. 
Duncan Luce, Neil J. Smelser & Dean R. Gerstein eds. 1989); COORDINATION OF INTERNET 
AGENTS: MODELS, TECHNOLOGIES, AND APPLICATIONS 429 (Andrea Omicini et al. eds., 
2001). 
 24.  See supra note 23. 
 25.  STEVEN ANTHONY HETCHER, NORMS IN A WIRED WORLD 254 (2004). 
 26.  Indeed, the Folk Theorem, see sinfra, note 27, informs us that many social dilemmas 
may be resolved by the mere presence of repeated interaction. See DAVID C. ROSE, THE MORAL 
FOUNDATION OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 44 (2011). 
 27.  Cooter, supra note 22. For the foundational work on this, see Drew Fudenberg & Eric 
Maskin, The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information, 54 
ECONOMETRICA, 533–54 (1986). 
 28.  “A social dilemma exists when there is an incentive structure that leads individual ac-
tors to take a course of action that produces a collectively undesirable outcome.” Toshio Yamag-
ishi, Seriousness of Social Dilemmas and the Provision of a Sanctioning System, 51 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 
32. 
 29.  RIDLEY, supra note 23, at 65. 
 30.  JULIAN NIDA-RÜMELIN- & WOLFGANG SPOHN, RATIONALITY, RULES, AND 
STRUCTURE 56 (2000). 
 31.  R.C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1366 (1993). 
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cause a small group is essentially an iterated game—it allows for re-
peated interactions with the same players.32 Consequently, game the-
ory predicts that small groups can give rise to informal legal ordering 
without having to rely upon State law.33 
B. The Mechanisms That Help Sustain Order 
Various mechanisms help guide and sustain this emergence. Indi-
viduals can rely on the threat of retaliation and reputational costs as 
enforcement mechanisms to encourage rule compliance. On the carrot 
side of the ledger, the element of reciprocal benefit that may accrue 
with repeated interaction reinforces such arrangements, cementing the 
social rules that emerge. Indeed, mutual self-interest alone may often 
be enough to sustain cooperation. Moreover, over time, these norms 
will tend to become internalized, infusing this customary order with 
an even greater stability. Yet it is not essential that these social rules be 
perfectly internalized by each participant. Indeed, many may privately 
reject their normative authority while outwardly conforming to them. 
However, the more widely internalized the customary order becomes, 
the more stable it is as a result of an increase in not only voluntary 
compliance, but also voluntary enforcement.34 These mechanisms, 
which are built into small groups, help cement and stabilize bottom-
up systems of social order. 
The upshot of all of this is order. Informal or even exceedingly 
formal rules often arise endogenously in small groups that repeatedly 
 
 32.  Cooter, supra note 22, at 723. There is also the element of reputational costs in small 
groups even where there is no repeated interaction between the same actors. The effectiveness 
of any repeated game, however, is in fact based upon reputation even if this is only in the limited 
sense of one’s reputation from preceding rounds of play. Indeed, “[r]eputations can make prom-
ises to perform credibly [sic] in small economies, and parties form trade associations partly to 
shrink the size of the relevant reputational group. . . . But reputations can be ineffective in large, 
heterogeneous economies . . . .” Alan Schwartz, The Enforcement of Contract and the Role of the 
State, in LEGAL ORDERINGS AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 104, 107 (Fabrizio Cafaggi et al. 
eds., 2007). 
 33.  Cooter, supra note 22, at 723. 
 34.  That individuals sanction norm offenders, often at even a considerable cost to them-
selves, has been well documented. See Ernst Fehr, et al., Strong Reciprocity, Human Cooperation, 
and the Enforcement of Social Norms, 13 HUM. NAT. 1, 1–25 (2002). 
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interact.35 Witness the spontaneous seating arrangements among stu-
dents in a class, or the unspoken rules of an office workplace. From 
members of an athletic team to the inmates of a prison, customary law 
arises naturally within groups that repeatedly interact. The key ele-
ment here is repeated interaction. We need not go into this here to 
any great technical depth, as game theorists and sociologists alike have 
extensively studied this. It is sufficient to merely note that it is well 
established that in small groups, stable social order can emerge because 
there is repeated interaction between the actors, and indeed, it often 
emerges rather robustly. 
C. The Large Group Problem 
Very little of this, however, holds true in the case of large groups. 
As group size increases, and there is less or no repeated interaction, the 
possibility of cooperation rapidly fades.36 In very large multi-person 
games, actors turn into one-shot players.37 That is, it ceases to be an 
iterated (a repeated) game. Because of this, things fall apart rather 
 
 35.  ROBERT BOYD & PETER J. RICHERSON, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF 
CULTURES 148 (2005). 
 36.  For a succinct overview of the early literature on this, see ROBERT BOYD, CULTURE 
AND THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 230 (1988). See also Klaus Manhart, Cooperation in 2- and 
N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma Games: A Simulation Study, 11 ANALYSE & KRITIK 134, 134 (1989). 
Indeed, group size has been an important feature of game theory research and one that has been 
extensively studied. Research has shown that cooperation decreases in large groups. See David 
De Cremer & Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Cooperation in Social Dilemmas and the Need to Belong: The 
Moderating Effect of Group Size, 7 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY, RES., AND PRAC. 168 (2003); 
N. L. Kerr, Illusions of Efficacy: The Effect of Group Size on Perceived Efficacy in Social Dilemmas, 25 
J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 287 (1989); W.B.G. Liebrand, The Effect of Social Motives, 
Communication and Group Size on Behaviour in a N-person Multi-Stage Mixed-Motive Game, 14 
EUR. J. OF SOC. PSYCH. 239 (1984). Indeed, it is well-recognized that the “conditions necessary 
for the evolution of reciprocity become extremely restrictive as group size increases.” BOYD, supra 
note 35, at 146. As powerful as the folk theorem is, it becomes less relevant as the size of the 
group increases. See also MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971) (examining the problem of free-riding in large 
groups). 
 37.  For a more detailed discussion, see RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 169 
(1982). See also OLSON, supra note 36. This dynamic can create the well-known “tragedy of the 
commons” described by Garrett Hardin in which the players are worse off following the rational 
dictates of their self-interest than if they coordinated their actions. Actors are driven to do so 
even when it is clear that it is not in anyone’s long-term interest for this to happen. See G. Hardin, 
The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1248 (1968). 
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quickly. All of the various mechanisms outlined above that help sustain 
bottom-up order suddenly vanish. As a result, an increase in group size 
worsens the problem of opportunism and free-riding, undermining the 
possibility of bottom-up decentralized social order.38 To simplify 
things we can call this the large-group problem. In large groups, custom-
ary social order cannot emerge as robustly (if at all) because there is no 
repeated interaction. Because of this, in large societies, State-enforced 
law is necessary to realign the incentive structure and prevent cheating. 
The State with its arsenal of sanctions acts as a guarantor that players 
will be motivated to cooperate. The take-away point is this: social or-
der can arise naturally in small groups; however, in large groups, be-
cause the key element needed to trigger customary law (repeated in-
teraction) is missing, social order must be imposed top-down. 
Having laid out how repeated interaction can stimulate customary 
order, the task before us now is to figure out a way to use this. The 
question is: How can the State exploit this insight to strategically trig-
ger the emergence of customary law? The following section maps out 
a way to achieve this. 
II. Finding a Trigger: How to Cultivate Customary Law 
In this section, I explain how the State may be able to trigger the 
emergence of customary law—to rig the game, if you will, in favor of 
customary order. As we have seen, repeated interaction tends to gen-
erate bottom-up order. The trick, therefore, is simply to lock people 
into relationships of repeated interaction. As long as this can be ac-
complished, the chances that customary law will arise increase signifi-
cantly. Put another way: if large groups discourage spontaneous social 
order and small groups tend to engender it, then the solution is to rec-
reate the dynamic of a small group. In this section I will suggest a sim-
ple strategy as to how this may be achieved. The centerpiece to the 
approach is the bifurcated nature of legal duties, so let us begin there. 
 
 38.  ROSE, supra note 26, at 44. 
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A. Differentiating Between Positive and Negative Duties 
Broadly defined, legal duties come in one of two forms.39 By far, 
the vast majority of legal duties are framed in the negative: one shall 
not infringe upon the property rights of the man who lives next to you; 
one shall not wantonly assault other people, and so on.40 These acts are 
what we must refrain from doing—they oblige inaction. Most do not 
relate to specific individuals but rather apply to all members of the 
public generally and are simultaneously owed to everyone.41 However, 
legal duties also come in the second, albeit less common form42 of pos-
itive duties owed to specific individuals.43 These are positive duties that 
require one to perform some overt act or another—that is, what we are 
obliged to do. I call the first kind of legal duty negative duties and the 
second positive duties. Positive duties are a lot less common. If one were 
to thumb through the pages of the criminal code of any random juris-
diction one would find scant few, if any, actual positive legal duties 
towards other individuals.44 Negative duties form the core of any crim-
inal code.45 Within this kind of “negative law,” positive duties to other 
parties do of course arise: fiduciary duties, a duty to warn, a duty of 
care, a duty to rescue, etc., but these are more exceptions than the 
norm. 
Why is this important? The distinction between positive and neg-
ative duties is important for our purposes because positive duties—spe-
cifically ongoing positive duties—create interaction between parties. 
 
 39.  FREDERICK POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE FOR STUDENTS OF THE 
COMMON LAW 56–57 (1896). 
 40.  JOHN FORGE, THE RESPONSIBLE SCIENTIST: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 236 
(2008). 
 41.  PATRICIA G. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATION 8 (1998). 
 42.  J.J. DU PLESSIS & JAMES MCCONVILL, MIRKO BAGARIC, PRINCIPLES OF 
CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 355 (2005) (“[T]here are very few positive moral 
duties imposed on us. This is also the case as far as the law is concerned. Thus it is rare that 
individuals are required to positively do an act . . . as opposed to refraining from engaging in 
conduct . . . .”). 
 43.  Some positive duties are not owed to specific individuals such as the legal duty to pay 
one’s taxes or the duty to scoop up after one’s dog in the park. For the purposes of this paper, we 
are interested in positive duties that are owed to specific parties. 
 44.  Cases where such positive duties do arise are treated in more detail below. See infra 
Part III.D. 
 45.  SMITH, supra note 41, at 7. 
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This opens the door to the possibility of using ongoing positive duties 
to trigger the emergence of customary order. The State can capitalize 
on the unique character of positive duties to indirectly stimulate cus-
tomary law through the top-down law it designs. 
B. How Ongoing Positive Duties Can Be Used to Trigger Customary Law 
To understand how this is possible, the question we need to ask 
here is: what exactly does an ongoing positive duty entail on a struc-
tural level? The answer: positive duties bring about the all-important 
ingredient of repeated interaction. Ongoing positive duties thrust peo-
ple into repeated interactions simply because they are actively doing 
something. To the extent that they require repeated interaction, posi-
tive duties recreate the dynamic of a small group. Ongoing positive 
duties help solve the previously discussed large-group problem because 
they carve out a specific set of participants from the amorphous mass 
of a faceless society and lock them into interaction with each other, 
effectively recreating the key conditions of a small group. 
By nature, an ongoing positive duty implies certain key properties: 
it defines the players and creates a discrete cycle of interaction. A pos-
itive duty by definition must be performed, and at a specific point in 
time by a specific party. Positive duties are, as Friedrich Hayek so per-
ceptively noted, “discrete in that they demand a particular quantity and 
quality of action at particular points in space and time.”46 Thus, if these 
obligations are ongoing, players are repeatedly thrust into interaction 
with one another and as a result, a stable legal order tends to emerge 
as the actors naturally coordinate their behavior. Moreover, these pat-
terns of legal order may increase in terms of sophistication and com-
plexity as parties formulate new rules (often entailing new positive du-
ties) to govern changes or elaboration in their interactions. Indeed, this 
 
 46.  JOHN C. W. TOUCHIE, HAYEK AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS FOR A 
MINIMALIST APPROACH TO LAW 155 (2005). Fuller also touches on the idea that particular 
forms of law can be distinguished in that they involve a certain call to action (though he is speak-
ing of customary law in general): “[W]hat is involved is not simply a negation, a prohibition of 
certain disapproved actions, but also the obverse side of this negation, the meaning it confers . . . 
approved actions, which then furnish a point of orientation for ongoing interactive responses.” 
FULLER, supra note 1, at 213–14. 
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process is eminently clear in the case of commercial contracts and com-
mercial relationships in general (this is discussed again in further detail 
below). The repeated cycles of interaction allow order to build on itself 
just as it tends to do in small groups. 
Law that only assigns negative duties implicitly lacks this potential. 
Negative duties do not create interaction. One is not engaging in re-
peated interaction with a specific party. In fact, a lack of interaction is 
the very goal of a negative duty. As such, negative duties do not recre-
ate the conditions of a small group. There is nothing to be repeated, 
nothing to be actively done.47 While positive duties naturally bring 
parties together, negative duties by their nature keep parties apart.48 
All of this boils down to a very simple but theoretically useful insight: 
ongoing positive duties facilitate the emergence of customary order 
because they bring parties together into relationships of repeated in-
teraction, recreating the conditions of a small group.49 For our pur-
poses, the nature of a positive duty and what it entails on a structural 
level is important because by strategically creating positive duties it 
may be possible for the State to stimulate the emergence of customary 
law.50 
 
 47.  Hayek also points this out. See TOUCHIE, supra note 46 (“Negative duties, then, being 
continuously in effect, are not ‘carried out’ or satisfied by the performance of conduct and can be 
addressed to the entire world.”). 
 48.  Or at least they do not bring parties together. 
 49.  Indeed, the impact of repeated interaction in rule-formation is quite evident in the 
case of long-term commercial contracts. 
 50.  Some key conceptual points regarding what precisely is meant here by a positive duty 
should be made clear, as its superficial similarity with other concepts may be a source of potential 
confusion. First, the notion of a positive duty should not be confused with the idea of a positive 
duty of care. While a positive duty always requires an overt action of some kind, a duty of care 
may or may not require an overt act. A duty of care is not always a positive duty as it is understood 
here. For example, if we say that an employer owes a positive duty of care to her employees to 
provide safe working conditions, this may or may not require the performance of an overt act. 
This would depend upon the particular situation: if in order to satisfy this duty of care to her 
employee, the employer must actively perform something (e.g. have ice removed daily from a 
loading dock) then it is a positive duty as understood here because it demands some overt action 
to be taken. If, however, to meet her positive duty of care to her worker, the employer need only, 
for example, refrain from dousing the loading dock with water on a cold day, then this is not a 
positive duty as it is understood here. It is in fact a negative duty because it requires one to refrain 
from action—that is, it requires inaction as opposed to action. The focus here is simply upon the 
nature of what is demanded: action or inaction. Negative duties demand inaction; positive duties 
require action. A duty of care may or may not demand overt action. 
DRUZIN.FINAL (UPDATED 6.11) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2014 8:04 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 28 
388 
 
C. A Hypothetical Example 
A hypothetical example may help clarify this process. Let us 
ground this in an example involving two scenarios: scenarios “Meal” 
and “No Meal.” Scenario Meal represents a positive duty situation, 
while scenario No Meal corresponds to situations that invoke negative 
duties. In scenario Meal, our protagonist, we will call him Bartley, has 
twenty friends who are required to help him prepare one meal a day. 
In scenario No Meal, Bartley simply announces to the entire world 
(somehow) that no one should ever help him make a meal of any kind. 
In scenario Meal there will emerge definite cycles of interaction be-
tween Bartley and his twenty friends. From this repeated interaction, 
even absent a centralized authority to formulate commands, a system 
of set “rules” will proliferate around this core meal-making duty. This 
will likely cover a wide array of details: e.g., which meal of the day, 
 
Another point: we should take care to not be confused by mere semantics. One can always 
frame a negative duty to appear positive in nature. For example, we can rephrase “do not open 
the window” as “keep the window closed (the present state being that the window is closed).” Yet 
regardless of how this is dressed up, there remains a fundamental difference between the ways 
the two types of duties are satisfied that cuts through this conceptual fog. A negative duty requires 
that the actor refrain from a specific act—that is, that a specific event should not occur. The actor 
can do an endless array of other acts; however, the act stipulated by the negative duty is not to be 
performed. Thus, in regards to the proscribed act, the actor can comply simply by inaction, “by 
‘sitting on one’s hands’” as one scholar puts it (i.e. not opening the window). TOUCHIE, supra 
note 46, at 154. A positive duty, by contrast, requires a specific kind of overt action in order for 
there to be compliance (i.e. opening the house)—a specific thing should occur. Regardless of how 
you frame it, not opening a closed window requires only inaction. 
Yet this is a bit more conceptually tricky than it may initially appear. In some situations it 
may not simply be a matter of “sitting on one’s hands” in that a negative duty may in fact require 
the performance of some supporting positive act. For example: “Do not go through a red light” 
requires inaction. It is a negative duty “Do not do X.” However, if you are driving a car speeding 
towards a red light, in order to not go through the red light, you will have to press on the brakes, 
gear down, etc., all of which are positive actions. However—and this is a key point—while not 
doing X may in some special situations require performing a positive action to achieve this goal 
of non-occurrence (i.e. not running the red), the end result is still that X is not performed—X 
does not occur. This point is important because the doing of X is what forms the basis of the 
interactional relationship between the parties. So long as X is not performed, no relationship of 
interaction arises even if circumstances require one or even many positive actions to achieve this. 
Thus, even in situations where positive actions are required in order to comply with a negative 
duty, the end result is the same: X does not occur and so the parties are not brought together into 
any kind of interactional relationship. It does not matter that positive actions were needed behind 
the scenes to achieve the inaction of not doing X. To sum up, if a specific overt act of some kind 
is demanded, then it is a positive duty; if no overt act is demanded, then it is a negative duty. 
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where, what kind of food on which day, who purchases what ingredi-
ents, who cooks what, who cleans, who selects the food, who bears 
what costs, and so on and so forth. Through the brute force of sheer 
repetition this ordering will tend to harden into established rules.51 An 
intricate patterning will emerge in the form of a collectively recog-
nized set of rules—a spontaneous system of cooperative order reflex-
ively formulated by the participants themselves: customary law. 
Scenario No Meal will not give rise to discrete systems of custom-
ary law. The key difference between scenarios Meal and No Meal is 
one of positive and negative duties. The actors are actually doing 
something. The existence of a positive duty (to help Bartley make a 
meal once a day) necessitates repeated interaction between specific 
parties. This repeated interaction then triggers the emergence of a 
complex system of rules. Consider for a moment how different the two 
scenarios are. In scenario No Meal, as long as the duty is being com-
plied with, by definition, nothing will ever occur and consequently 
there is nothing to build on. The essential basis for customary law—
repeated interaction—is simply not present. In fact, the players are not 
even known to each other: it is never clear who is not helping Bartley 
make a meal. It is quite the opposite of a small-group dynamic where 
people repeatedly interact. The negative duty in scenario No Meal ac-
tually discourages interaction between parties and so discourages such 
a dynamic. The large-group problem remains unsolved. With scenario 
Meal, however, the players are actively engaging with one another and 
so a degree of bottom-up ordering is very likely to materialize. The 
large-group problem is solved. While this hypothetical may help clar-
ify the point on a conceptual level, a living example of how positive 
duties help trigger customary law would go a long way in making a 
more persuasive case. Fortunately, we have such an example. 
 
 51.  Also of great significance, though not delved into deeply here, is that over time the 
rule may even be internalized, taking on a genuine normative quality. For instance, the norm may 
emerge that Bartley should be the lead cook because it is his home. Indeed, a commonly cited 
defense (although not a very compelling one) when a normative rule is challenged is “that is just 
the way we have always done it.” 
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D. A Living Example: Commercial Customary Law and the Law 
Merchant 
If positive duties are such powerful generators of bottom-up or-
dering where, the unpersuaded reader may ask, is there a concrete ex-
ample of this? Should not its effects be readily observable? The answer 
is that they are. We can discern the tendency of positive duties to give 
rise to stable customary order when we examine people engaging in 
repeated commercial activity.52 Customary order in commercial com-
munities vividly illustrates the ability of positive duties to induce cus-
tomary law. As Jeremy Waldron observes, “the example of com-
merce . . . is a prototype of how the mundane growth of repeated 
contact between different humans and human groups can lay the foun-
dation for the emergence of . . . norms, in a way that does not neces-
sarily presuppose a formal juridical apparatus.”53  
It is positive duties that structurally enable this “repeated contact.” 
Commercial relationships may generate robust forms of customary or-
der can be traced to the fact that people engaging in commerce assume 
clear positive duties towards each other: participants are actively doing 
something with specific partners as opposed to merely refraining from 
doing something. Such is the nature of trade. 
It is quite apparent how positive duties create the structural frame-
work of repeated interaction if we take the case of a typical commercial 
contract: A orders goods from B; B delivers the goods on a certain date; 
A pays for them on delivery. The round is complete, and then the play-
ers can repeat it.54 From this milieu, therefore, a stabilized body of cus-
tomary norms can materialize. There are of course other reasons for 
 
 52.  I have explored this idea from different angles elsewhere. See Bryan H. Druzin, Law 
Without The State: The Theory Of High Engagement and the Emergence of Spontaneous Legal Order 
within Commercial Systems, 41 GEO. J. OF INT’L L. 559, 561 (2010) (positing a theory I term “high 
engagement theory,” that may account for the ability of commerce to generate and sustain de-
centralized legal order). See also Bryan Druzin, Opening the Machinery of Private Order: Public In-
ternational Law as a Form of Private Ordering, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. (2013) (forthcoming) (positing 
that positive duties help sustain commercial contracts by establishing trust through repeated 
rounds of signaling). 
 53.  Jeremy Waldron, Cosmopolitan Norms, ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 83, 94 (Seyla 
Benhabib et al. eds., 2006). 
 54.  Even if this interaction is short-lived, reputational costs within the broader merchant 
community help create and sustain order. 
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the success of commercial customary law that more quickly leap to 
mind: namely, the mutual benefit provided by commercial trade. How-
ever, this only explains the motivation for why these actors come to-
gether into relationships of repeated interaction. On a structural level, 
it is the fact that these relationships are repeated that explains why they 
are able to create and sustain bottom-up order. The specific manner 
of interaction involved in commercial activity—i.e. that individuals are 
actively dealing with each other—is key to truly understanding the 
phenomenon of customary law in the realm of commercial trade.55 In-
deed, the ability of long-term commercial relationships to reduce op-
portunism and sustain stable partnerships has been widely noted by 
many theorists and linked to the fact that they are in essence repeated 
games.56 While customary order that arises within commercial com-
munities may give rise to negative duties just as much as positive duties, 
positive duties form the backbone of such customary order. Without 
such duties, there would be no repeated interaction and thus no op-
portunity for customary order in the first place. 
Because it can depend upon customary law to take the helm, the 
State’s role in commercial contracts may be relatively minimal com-
pared with other areas of law.57 Recognizing this, the State has tradi-
tionally assumed a very minimalist tack in relation to contract. Under 
 
 55.  Of course, as already discussed, the lure of benefit and the potential loss of it plays a 
crucial role in sustaining order. However, my point here is that for this to have the impact it does 
there must be repeated interaction. I take up the idea of the structural nature of trade’s ability to 
develop and sustain legal order elsewhere, albeit from a slightly different tack. See Druzin, supra 
note 52, at 116 (positing that the unique manner of interaction implied by commerce plays a 
crucial role in this capacity to evolve spontaneously in the absence of a clear state authority). 
 56.  See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, L. & ECON. 244–45 (1988); GARY J. 
MILLER, MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HIERARCHY ch. 10 (1995); 
JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 260–314 (1994); Gary S. 
Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); Douglas Bernheim & Debraj Ray, Collective Dynamic Consistency in Re-
peated Games, 1 GAMES & ECON. BEH. 295 (1989); Joseph Farrell & Eric Maskin, Renegotiation 
in Repeated Games, 1 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 327 (1989); L. G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing 
Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27 (1981); See also ANTHONY DE JASAY, AGAINST POLITICS: ON 
GOVERNMENT, ANARCHY, AND ORDER 186 (1997) (“Many historical episodes show that the 
private enforcement of customary contract law thrived whenever the state for one reason or an-
other was unable forcibly or amicably to displace conventional cooperation.”). 
 57.  This brand of legal minimalism forms the core of the nineteenth century laissez-faire 
view of contract law. Roscoe Pound described this approach stating that “the law was conceived 
negatively as a system of hands off while [people] do things rather than as a system of ordering 
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the banner of freedom of contract, the State allows the parties them-
selves to formulate the particular legal order under which they wish to 
operate.58 Indeed, for all intents and purposes, parties to a contract are 
“a kind of miniature legislature, and their law a miniature statute.”59 
This capacity for autonomy extends even to the case of enforcement. 
While the received wisdom from Hobbes is that contracts “without the 
sword are but words of no strength,”60 the vast majority of commercial 
agreements are in fact fulfilled without having to go to court.61 In fact, 
empirical research has shown that most business transactions are exe-
cuted without entering into formal contracts of any kind.62 This is of 
course not to deny that formal enforcement remains a more effective 
way to ensure compliance—promises are clearly more secure with a 
vigorous enforcement regime in place;63 however, degrees of self-en-
forcement are nevertheless highly possible even without the iron hand 
of state.64 
 
to prevent friction and waste.” LINDA MULCAHY & JOHN TILLOTSON, CONTRACT LAW IN 
PERSPECTIVE 34 (2004). 
 58.  RICHARD STONE, THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACT 8 (2009); MINDY CHEN-
WISHART, CONTRACT LAW 13 (2012). Guided by the principle of self-regulation and freedom 
of contract, the courts are generally very reluctant to interfere with the parties’ agreement. See 
RYAN MURRAY, CONTRACT LAW: THE FUNDAMENTALS 90 (2008). 
 59.  ROBERT S. SUMMERS & LON L. FULLER, JURISTS: PROFILES IN LEGAL THEORY 81 
(1984). 
 60.  THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 155 (A.P. Martinich & Brian Battiste eds., Broadview 
Press 2010). 
 61.  See SUMMERS, supra note 59. Indeed, “Private mechanisms generate some degree of 
contract compliance . . . .” JEFFREY A. MIRON, LIBERTARIANISM FROM A TO Z 74 (2010). For 
some early examinations of self-enforcing agreements, see Telser, supra note 56, at 27; B. Klein 
& K.B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 
615 (1981). See B.L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J. 644, 
646 (1989). 
 62.  See S. Macauley, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. 
REV. 55 (1963). See also Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and In-
digenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 2 (1981); AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND 
ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE MODES OF GOVERNANCE 25 (2007) (“Most business transac-
tions . . . are conducted using various informal arrangements, such as handshakes and oral agree-
ments, ongoing relationships, and custom and practice.”). 
 63.  ROSE, supra note 26, at 45. 
 64.  See DIXIT, supra note 62, at 27 (“One may think that . . . methods of private ordering 
must suffer a crippling disadvantage relative to the government’s courts, namely their lack of 
coercive power to ensure that their decisions are obeyed. However, the difficulty is often nonex-
istent or easily overcome.”). 
DRUZIN.FINAL (UPDATED 6.11) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2014 8:04 PM 
373] Planting Seeds of Order  
393 
 
History is littered with examples of fairly robust systems of cus-
tomary law of a commercial nature.65 An oft-referenced example is the 
case of the medieval law merchant—the international system of mer-
chant law that arose across vast swaths of Europe during the tenth, 
eleventh, and twelfth centuries. During this period, merchants dealing 
with each other in fairs across Europe developed their own intricate 
body of rules.66 This system of law was “voluntarily produced, volun-
tarily adjudicated and voluntarily enforced.”67 The medieval law mer-
chant is a good example of a coherent system of customary law arising 
from the maelstrom of repeated and sustained interaction.68 Absent the 
State, familiar enforcement mechanisms such as reputational costs, re-
ciprocal benefit, and internalization helped sustain the law merchant 
among communities of traders over centuries.69 In fact, despite its 
many deficiencies, commercial law has frequently evolved in the vac-
uum of a single coercive power and continues to do so today; “custom-
ary commercial law flourishes and promotes order in most of our mod-
ern merchant society, much as it did in the medieval period.”70 Indeed, 
customary law still “plays an especially important role in basic markets 
 
 65.  HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF WESTERN 
LEGAL TRADITION 333 (1983) (discussing the medieval law merchant). See also, Lisa Bernstein, 
Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Coop-
eration through Norms, Rules, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001);  Karen Clay, Trade 
without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican California, 13 J. L., ECON., & ORG. 202 (1997); 
Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. 
ECON. HIST. 857 (1989); Richard Zerbe & C. Leigh Anderson, Culture and Fairness in the Devel-
opment of Institutions in the California Gold Fields, 61 J. ECON. HIST. 114 (2001). See also Claire 
Cutler et al., The Contours and Significance of Private Authority in International Affairs, in PRIVATE 
AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 333, 351 (A. Claire Cutler et al. eds., 1999) (con-
tending that private ordering has existed in many historical periods). 
 66.  Cooter, supra note 2, at 217. 
 67.  Benson, supra note 61, at 647. 
 68.  Cooter, supra note 22, at 723. 
 69.  Benson, supra note 61, at 660. 
 70.  Id. See also Gillian Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law, 24 REG. MAG. 40, 41 (2001) 
(observing that from “the Middle Ages to the infant digital age, there are examples of law devel-
oped and administered by private entities with varying degrees of state involvement.”). 
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where state enforcement of contracts fails, as in capital markets in de-
veloping countries.”71 Moreover, trade organizations and similar com-
mercial communities can provide the framework for repeated interac-
tion in that they mimic the dynamic of a small group.72 
The example of customary commercial law strongly supports the 
present thesis. Because commercial parties are actively dealing with 
each other on a repeated basis (or indirectly through the larger com-
munity) in that they perform positive acts (i.e. trade), customary law 
can arise between commercial parties without the need for the State to 
explicitly formulate rules. Communities of traders, therefore, tend to 
naturally create a coherent system of customary order. Without the 
brute force of repeated interaction structurally ensured by the perfor-
mance of positive duties, it would be difficult for private order of this 
kind to emerge.73 Indeed, customary commercial order illustrates quite 
clearly the generative potential of positive duties. By establishing pos-
itive duties, commercial parties recreate the conditions of the small 
group that facilitate the emergence of customary law (active, repeated 
interaction). With this in mind, the burning question for our project 
is: to what extent can we use this insight? What are its broader impli-
cations and how far can we take it? 
 
 71.  Cooter, supra note 22, at 723 (footnotes omitted). 
 72.  Robert D. Cooter & Janet T. Landa, Personal versus Impersonal Trade: The Size of Trad-
ing Groups and Contract Law, 4 INT’L REV. L. & ECON., 15–22 (1984). See also studies of modern 
diamond exchanges and commodity trading associations by Lisa Bernstein. Bernstein, supra note 
64. See also Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for 
Immanent Business Norms, 114 U. PA. L. REV., 1643–96 (1996). The idea of a new law merchant 
is a point of intense theoretical interest that has garnered a cascade of literature starting around 
the 1980s and continuing today. For an early yet comprehensive examination of the law mer-
chant, see generally LEON TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF 
COMMERCIAL LAW (1983). 
 73.  In the economics and legal literature, the term private ordering—the coming together 
of non-governmental parties in voluntary, self-enforcing arrangements—is often used to describe 
this form of self-ordering. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 65 (using the term “private ordering” 
to refer to private enforcement); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319 
(2002) (using the term to refer to private enforcement or regulation); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, 
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 163–68 (1985) (making the case that repeated 
play and reputation are “private ordering” tools for enforcement). 
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III. Cultivating Customary Law: Its Potential and Its 
Limitations 
Having discussed how positive duties can stimulate customary law, 
we may now turn our attention to an exploration of the policy potential 
that flows from this. What has been discussed up to this point has been 
exceedingly theoretical. This section, the final section of the paper, 
applies this theory, outlining how the State can create, shape, and use 
customary order. 
A. The Possibility of Triggering Customary Law as a Matter of Policy 
If we accept as true the premise that ongoing positive duties be-
tween parties stimulate customary law, the question that presents itself 
is this: could not the State exploit this and deliberately legislate specific 
ongoing positive duties between individuals in order to strategically 
trigger the emergence of customary order? The State in theory could 
craft positive duties between citizens that pull actors into stable rela-
tionships of repeated interaction thereby ensuring a degree of recur-
ring interaction sufficient to stimulate customary law.74 In this way, the 
State could channel the energy of customary law to allow customary 
order to blossom in a relatively targeted manner. The State could 
“grow” social order much like a gardener who plants seeds in particular 
configurations, columns, rows, circles, etc., but then allows nature to 
take its course. 
In addition to being ongoing, these positive duties would prefera-
bly be broad and open-ended. This would allow the participants to ac-
tively coordinate around them and self-organize. The ongoing positive 
duty would merely ensure that the parties are sufficiently yoked to-
gether in a relationship of repeated interaction; the rest would then 
simply be a matter of bottom-up ordering. Customary law would arise 
just as Lon Fuller describes it: “practices are often open-ended and 
oblique at the outset, and become refined and fixed only by a gradual 
process of adjustment and accommodation. They commonly “‘glide 
 
 74.  There is a certain undeniable irony to such a proposal in that the proponents of bot-
tom-up law typically advocate quite vociferously for State minimalism. For such scholars, this 
kind of legal engineering would, no doubt, be anathema to their views. 
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into being imperceptibly’ . . . The stabilized practices that ultimately 
emerge are typically tacit, yet recurrent.”75 From these practices, a 
fairly coherent body of customary law may evolve. Yet the initial di-
rection of this system of order would be set by policymakers. 
To different degrees of success, customary law is perfectly capable 
of accomplishing many of the primary functions performed by State 
law: i.e. prevent social conflict; provide authoritative rules for conduct; 
provide public goods; solve collective action problems, and so forth. 
Yet, it may do so with some important comparative advantages. In-
deed, we can expect several benefits to such a system of cooperative 
order over that of top-down law. These advantages were enumerated 
in the introduction but are worth repeating here in a little more detail. 
Just keeping the overall role of the State to a bare minimum provides 
many advantages.76 For instance, resources are used in light of local 
knowledge, so a more efficient allocation of responsibilities in terms of 
maximizing the individual skills and expertise of the participants can 
be expected.77 With customary ordering, the task of making accurate 
social welfare assessments through complex political processes is com-
pletely bypassed.78 The rules that emerge will be ground-tested and 
pragmatic.79 Customary law may be far more suited to issues of a rela-
tively trivial matter when “individual violations (though perhaps not 
aggregate violations) are too trivial . . . to justify the expense of trials, 
police, and prisons.”80  
Moreover, having arisen bottom-up, customary rules already have 
the community’s authority and are likely to be widely internalized. As 
a result, the entire system may be more robust, reinforced by a sturdy 
 
 75.  SUMMERS, supra note 59, at 78. 
 76.  Indeed, legislators are not always the wisest creators of law. As Ellickson notes, “law-
makers who are unappreciative of the social conditions that foster informal cooperation are likely 
to create a world in which there is both more law and less order.” R. C. ELLICKSON, ORDER 
WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 286 (1991). 
 77.  See Tullock, arguing that “voluntarily entered-on social arrangements should be 
taken as optimal from society’s point of view.” G. TULLOCK, PRIVATE WANTS, PUBLIC NEEDS: 
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE DESIRABLE SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT (1987). 
 78.  Francesco Parisi, Towards a Theory of Spontaneous Law, 6 CONST. POL. ECON. 211, 
212 (1995). 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  See Richard Posner & Eric Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Ref-
erence to Sanctions, 19 INT. REV. L. & ECON. 369, 380 (1999). 
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normative underpinning,81 and importantly, the State need not formu-
late nor enforce any of this—the entire system may be sufficiently self-
sustaining, reducing burdensome governance costs.82 All of this makes 
the prospect of cultivating customary law particularly attractive. 
B. State-Imposed Lawn Care and Other Forms of “Engineered” Customary 
Order 
1. Lawn care 
To illustrate in concise terms how the State could trigger the 
emergence of customary law, let us take lawn care as an example. If the 
State considered it in the public interest that everyone take better care 
of their front yards, rather than concocting intricate laws requiring 
people to do so (something that would require unrealistic levels of 
monitoring and enforcement), the State could adopt the more deft ap-
proach of customary law cultivation. The State could harness the self-
ordering potential of repeated interaction by requiring, for example, 
that the residents of a street collectively tend to one of the yards on the 
street each Sunday (the yard to be tended would change each week to 
ensure reciprocity). Non-compliance would be subject to a small fine. 
Instead of fabricating and enforcing a complex system of regulation, 
the State could simply impose a single legal obligation yet one that 
deliberately comprises an ongoing positive duty so as to bring private 
parties together into relationships of repeated interaction. This 
stripped-down, base, ongoing positive duty (“tending to a specific yard 
every Sunday”) would instantly demand a litany of positive acts be-
tween the residents of the street. For example, residents would have to 
decide when to water the grass, how much, where, who would weed, 
etc. The State would, in this manner, simply allow the parties to fill in 
the details, inducing them to essentially fashion a system of customary 
legal order rather than imposing one upon them. We could reasonably 
expect this customary order to be the most optimal for those partici-
pants and even internalized over time. The many benefits of customary 
 
 81.  Parisi, supra note 78. 
 82.  R.D. Cooter, Against Legal Centrism, 81 CAL. L. REV. 425, 425 (1992). 
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law would follow: these rules would have a greater chance of being 
more efficient, robust, pragmatic, and self-enforcing. 
As with the example of Bartley and his friends, this ordering would 
harden into established customary order through the sheer force of 
repetition. To sharpen my point: imagine if this process was repeated 
over a period of one hundred years, or five hundred. Indeed, a very 
powerful and well-articulated system of customary law would un-
doubtedly emerge. In this example, the State is in essence sub-con-
tracting law-making and enforcement to the actors themselves, ensur-
ing only that they are bound together into patterns of repeated 
interaction. The State simply creates the crucial dynamic of repeated 
interaction founded on a core ongoing positive duty and then allows 
the parties to produce more sophisticated rules related to this newly 
created point of interaction—“planting seeds of order” centered 
around the principle of lawn care. The rest is a natural process. Again, 
the standard mechanisms that help sustain customary law would likely 
arise, i.e. reputational costs, reciprocal benefit, and internalization. 
2. Social goals more clearly in the public interest: various possibilities 
Of course, the social good in promoting proper lawn care is, to be 
charitable, questionable. However, there are social goals that are more 
clearly in the public interest. Customary law cultivation could be used 
to achieve many of these. Examples include bottom-up: community 
security; local poverty relief; sanitation standards; road safety mainte-
nance; conservation and environmental efforts; public health initia-
tives; community construction projects; agricultural projects; educa-
tional services; various forms of community service; and so on and so 
forth. The desirability and appropriateness of these programs would 
vary from place to place. For example, customary systems that promote 
water conservation may only suit drought-prone regions while road 
safety maintenance may only be appropriate for extremely remote, ru-
ral areas of the country. Similarly, customary systems aimed at security 
may only be useful in either crime-ridden urban areas or very remote 
areas where police security may not be as readily available. Systems of 
customary order related to forest fire prevention may be more useful 
to cultivate within communities in the forests of Washington State 
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than in downtown Manhattan. Triggering customary order may be es-
pecially useful within certain commercial communities where the pol-
icymakers may wish to promote specific standards—e.g. hygiene or 
safety practices. Such communities represent a defined subset of soci-
ety already possessing a certain commonality and a natural degree of 
repeated interaction, and so it may prove even easier to trigger cus-
tomary order with respect to them. 
An historical example that structurally parallels the above model of 
collective lawn care is that of collective barn building, a custom once 
extremely common in 18th and 19th-century rural North American 
communities known as a “barn raising” or a “raising bee.”83 The prac-
tice involved the building or repair of a barn collectively by all the 
members of the community for a particular member, an act that was 
reciprocated at a later date.84 The custom of barn-building was able to 
develop because the nature of these rural communities ensured suffi-
cient repeated interaction. However, while social dynamics that are 
pre-disposed to relationships of repeated interaction (such as residen-
tial communities) are natural fits, it is important here to note that the 
small group dynamic may be artificially constructed. As commercial 
customary law demonstrates, it need not depend on actual physical 
proximity; it merely depends upon a sufficient degree of repeated in-
teraction. Moreover, while the essential ingredient is that the actors 
are linked together in relationships of repeated interaction, the partic-
ular form that this takes is less important: it may be many actors per-
forming a task in relation to one member (as in the lawn care example); 
it may be a group of actors interacting with a larger group; it may be a 
single actor performing an action for many actors; it may be actors 
working in dyadic relationships (in pairs); or it may be an entire group 
of actors working in concert to achieve some collective end. Indeed 
other variations could be imagined. Different structural arrangements 
may be more or less suited to particular situations. The key element, 
however, is creating relationships of repeated interaction. 
 
 83.  See generally TINA LONSKI, BARN RAISING: STORIES OF A VANISHING AMERICAN 
LEGACY (2008). 
 84.  Id. 
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3. Recycling 
For the most part, top-down law is a cumbersome method of legal 
creation. The more nuanced approach of cultivating customary law 
can, in the right circumstances, prove to be a more agile technique for 
shaping social order. Such a light-footprint approach may be more 
suited to certain areas than the brute force of top-down law. This is 
particularly true for areas where direct top-down monitoring and en-
forcement may be taxing, logistically challenging, or raise privacy con-
cerns. Recycling is a good example. Indeed, in the case of recycling, 
“[m]onitoring and enforcement . . . can often be extremely difficult, 
expensive, or impossible. Simply mandating a reduction in garbage dis-
posal, for example, can turn government officials into garbage 
snoops.”85 Rather than forcing people to recycle through the brute 
force of top-down coercion, the State can instead attempt to achieve 
this indirectly by cultivating customary law related to recycling. This 
time, let us use the example of a floor in a residential high-rise to flesh 
out in greater detail the various ways customary order could, in theory, 
be triggered. One variation could require one resident to sort the re-
cycling for the entire floor. This would be performed on a rotating 
basis so that the duty would eventually pass to every resident on the 
floor, ensuring reciprocity and an equitable distribution of responsi-
bility. 
If a more complex system of order is desired, all the residents of 
the floor could be mandated to perform the task as a single group 
thereby allowing specific roles and duties to be naturally assigned as 
the residents interacted. A more complex customary order such as this 
has the potential to more easily build on itself as it responds to new 
ideas, requirements, tweaks and changes regarding the activity—new 
community rules may emerge endogenously as the group coordinates 
cooperation. Another variation could yoke the residents together into 
dyadic relationships: Neighbor A could sort the recycling for herself 
and neighbor B once a week, and then neighbor B can do likewise the 
following week.86 Still another, even more creative variation would be 
 
 85.  Carlson, supra note 14, at 1245. 
 86.  This variation, however, suffers from the limitation of being vulnerable to mutually 
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to link the residents into dyadic relationships that form an overlapping 
chain: i.e. neighbor A bears the recycling duty for neighbor B, neigh-
bor B for neighbor C, neighbor C for neighbor D, and neighbor D for 
neighbor A (closing the chain). Alternatively, the chain could connect 
the entire building (or an entire city). Again, the duty would be estab-
lished on an alternating basis in order to ensure reciprocity. 
Regardless of the particular form, the idea is simply to bind actors 
together into relationships of repeated interaction. Again, the large-
group problem is the lack of repeated interaction. The solution, there-
fore, is simply to create the conditions so that there is repeated inter-
action. The dyadic variations above mimic the structural dynamic of a 
commercial community, where traders interact with each other di-
rectly and in an indirect yet interconnected fashion. Different varia-
tions may be more or less appropriate depending upon the particular 
form of customary order the State seeks to foster (i.e. simple or com-
plex). In each variation, non-compliance would be subject to a small 
fine. While fee-riding may be “reported” (to use a chilling phrase), in 
practice this is unlikely to occur very often: if customary ordering suc-
cessfully sets in, the system should be largely self-sustaining without 
the need to rely upon State enforcement. Social pressures, reputational 
costs, reciprocal benefit, and internalization will likely be more than 
adequate to ensure compliance. Anti-smoking laws are a good example 
of this dynamic. In many western countries, customary norms prohib-
iting smoking in certain public areas have been so successfully culti-
vated that they are now widely observed while in actual practice rarely 
formally enforced. Enforcement was only needed in the initial stages. 
A similar dynamic can be observed in the case of laws regarding litter-
ing, dog waste, and spitting in public.87 Customary rules have a very 
healthy chance of becoming self-enforcing. Indeed, the twin elements 
of repetition and time can forge an extremely robust, self-sustaining 
system of customary law. 
 
agreed upon defection. See infra note 109. 
 87.  CHESTER N. MITCHELL, THE DRUG SOLUTION 200 (1990). 
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C. WWII Scrap Drives and Chinese Work Units: Historical Examples of 
the State Fostering Customary Order 
The unpersuaded reader should consider that schemes aimed at 
fostering specific systems of customary order have been implemented 
in the past with great success. Such schemes capitalized on the order-
inducing effects of repeated interaction. A good example is that of war-
time recycling schemes. During WWII, local “scrap drives” (and a 
complimentary food rationing program) were initiated by communi-
ties across the United States to collect materials vital to the war effort 
(as in many other countries).88 Government undertook a massive effort 
to promote customary norms that promoted recycling.89 Local salvage 
committees recruited thousands of women and children to regularly 
go door-to-door and collect scrap material.90 Crucially, these scrap 
drives were community-based and carried out on a local level. Differ-
ent rules emerged depending on location and community. While the 
collection methods varied, these efforts were all “cleverly designed to 
maximize face-to-face contact among potential participants. . .”91 As a 
direct result of these citizen-led programs, recycling and rationing 
quickly set in as pervasive customary norms—the overriding cultural 
ethos became one of conservation for the public good.92 A robust sys-
tem of customary order related to recycling materialized. Scrap drives 
became a common community activity, popping up across the country. 
Schools, classes, service clubs, towns, counties, and even states com-
peted with each other to collect scrap for the war effort.93 Initially, such 
rationing was completely voluntary; only later as the war progressed 
were these norms finally codified into formal law (when they were al-
ready widely established).94 Citizens would admonish those who did 
 
 88.  ANNE E. MACZULAK, RENEWABLE ENERGY: SOURCES AND METHODS 46 (2010). 
 89.  Carlson, supra note 14, at 1257. 
 90.  KEN GEISER, MATERIALS MATTER: TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE MATERIALS POLICY 
217 (2001). 
 91.  Carlson, supra note 14, at 1258. 
 92.  CARL A. ZIMRING, CASH FOR YOUR TRASH: SCRAP RECYCLING IN AMERICA 94 
(2009). 
 93.  R. DOUGLAS HURT, THE GREAT PLAINS DURING WORLD WAR II 95 (2008). 
 94.  DAVID WHITE & DANIEL P. MURPHY, THE EVERYTHING WORLD WAR II BOOK: 
PEOPLE, PLACES, BATTLES, AND ALL THE KEY EVENTS 284 (2007). 
DRUZIN.FINAL (UPDATED 6.11) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2014 8:04 PM 
373] Planting Seeds of Order  
403 
 
not comply. No doubt, social pressures, reputational concerns, and in-
ternalization played a significant role in bolstering customary order 
related to war-time recycling. 
The results of scrapping efforts were impressive. Prior to the war, 
large-scale recycling was comparatively rare.95 During the war, the 
United States, a country of roughly 138 million at that time, recycled 
approximately twenty-five percent of its total refuse.96 Official strate-
gies relied mostly on marketing campaigns and patriotic appeals.97 The 
success, however, can be largely attributed to the fact that these pro-
grams were created and implemented on the local community level 
where repeated interaction was already vibrantly present. While the 
recycling initiatives were no doubt guided by a vague appreciation for 
the power of creating order on the localized level where repeated in-
teraction is rife, it is interesting to consider how much more powerful 
this kind of social engineering might have been if it had more effi-
ciently utilized the machinery of customary ordering by strategically 
constructing such relationships. Indeed, absent the powerful patriotic 
sentiment aroused by war, to achieve comparable levels of success, pol-
icymakers would need to go about planting seeds of order in a more 
targeted fashion than the haphazard strategy of mass marketing cam-
paigns. 
There are other, more uncomfortable examples (at least for the av-
erage American) of the effectiveness of partitioning large numbers of 
people into smaller groups in order to engineer customary order. In-
deed, throughout the pre-reform era (prior to the 1980s), this ap-
proach was a fundamental organizational principle of Chinese com-
munist urban administration.98 While the structural mechanics of 
fostering customary order through repeated interaction was not un-
derstood in the context of game theory, its effects were clearly not lost 
on Chinese policymakers. Chinese citizens were partitioned into small 
 
 95.  H. LANIER HICKMAN, AMERICAN ALCHEMY: THE HISTORY OF SOLID WASTE 
MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2003). 
 96.  MACZULAK, supra note 88, at 47. 
 97.  ZIMRING, supra note 92. 
 98.  Janet Weitzner Salaff, Urban Residential Communities in the Wake of the Cultural Revo-
lution, THE CITY IN COMMUNIST CHINA 289, 289 (John Wilson Lewis ed., 1971). 
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networks that largely defined their social world99 (similar social cells 
were common in the Soviet Union and other communist countries100). 
In China, these networks were patterned around an individual’s daily 
repeated interactions and so were based upon the person’s place of em-
ployment.101 These work units, the dan wei (單位), maintained basic 
services such as housing, child care, dining, medical care, shops, etc.102 
They were in essence “small societies,” artificial villages of a sort.103 All 
government departments, state-owned companies, factories, shops, 
hospitals, and universities and schools each represented a single dan 
wei. The size of a dan wei varied considerably depending on the insti-
tution that it represented; however, the average size was approximately 
100 members104—a good number to ensure a healthy degree of re-
peated interaction and maximize the small-group dynamic to cultivate 
customary order. 
While in the countryside the close-knit ties of the village remained, 
carving out small clusters of actors who repeatedly interacted was cru-
cial in larger urban areas where repeated interaction could vanish in-
side the anonymity of a large city. The solution: Chinese society was 
“sliced into millions of isolated danwei.” Chinese society was a giant 
honey comb: “each danwei formulated an independent and closed cell.” 
The dan wei system was the main vehicle through which the State ex-
ecuted its political and social policies. Through it, the State “grew” 
rules, values, assumptions, and norms that promoted collectivist val-
ues.105 For the individual, the rules and norms of their dan wei reigned 
supreme.106  
 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  XIABOLO LÜ & ELIZABETH J. PERRY, DANWEI: THE CHANGING CHINESE 
WORKPLACE IN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 21 (1997). 
 101.  Salaff, supra note 98. 
 102.  LÜ, supra note 100. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  KERRY BROWN, FRIENDS AND ENEMIES: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF 
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 63 (2009). 
 105.  DAVID BRAY, SOCIAL SPACE AND GOVERNANCE IN URBAN CHINA: THE DANWEI 
SYSTEM FROM ORIGINS TO REFORM 145 (2005). 
 106.  Id. at 144. 
DRUZIN.FINAL (UPDATED 6.11) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2014 8:04 PM 
373] Planting Seeds of Order  
405 
 
No doubt, social pressures, reputational concerns, reciprocal ben-
efit, and internalization aided by repeated interaction drove this pro-
cess of norm formation forward, displacing the need for top-down en-
forcement. The dan wei was “the cornerstone of. . . social control in 
the cities.”107 As such, the strategy was highly effective.108 The dan wei 
provided a degree of repetition more than sufficient to generate and 
solidify a discrete system of customary order the State could channel 
in a direction of its choosing. 
Second World War scrap drives and Chinese communist work 
units may strike the reader as very different social projects. Yet in both 
these cases the same basic strategy was invoked to cultivate a certain 
customary order: the crucial characteristic of the small group—re-
peated interaction—was indirectly exploited in order to foster custom-
ary norms. Both scrap drives and the dan wei system were constructed 
around pre-existing patterns of interaction represented by a social net-
work of some kind. Scrap drives were centered on schools, companies, 
churches, or entire towns. A dan wei represented a company, school, or 
government department. In both cases, the small-group dynamic was 
harnessed to cultivate customary order—not with a precise under-
standing of game theory, but with a general appreciation of the cus-
tomary order-inducing effects of small-group interaction. The present 
thesis, however, contends that there need not even be a pre-existing 
pattern of interaction: positive legal duties may be used to artificially 
create such patterns. The State only need bind actors together into 
relationships of repeated interaction centered around a simple base ob-
ligation, and then let the natural processes of bottom-up ordering take 
effect. Such duties would be oblique and rudimentary so that specific 
rules and norms emerge in due course as the targeted parties interact 
and established norms set in.109 Many socially desirable ends could be 
achieved in this way, all without the need for top-down intervention 
 
 107.  JIANFENG WANG, THE POLITICS OF NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 6 
(2008). 
 108.  Id. at 7. 
 109.  While binding together large groups of actors into such relationships is preferable, 
there is no reason why this could not just as easily be applied between just two participants (as 
touched upon above). However, given the possibility of mutually agreed upon defection, a more 
robust system of bottom-up order is more likely in the case of large groups of actors. 
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and micro-legal creation. As the relationships between these actors 
strengthen, crystallizing into norms, the State would likely find it less 
necessary to enforce the initial base requirement; the entire system of 
order should stand a good chance of becoming self-enforcing and even 
self-generating. The State only need to give the dynamic an initial 
push by laying the structural framework for repeated interaction; in its 
wake, customary order may then set in and flower in complexity. 
D. The Normative Argument Against Cultivating Customary Law 
That said, there are, however, painfully obvious obstacles to this 
kind of legal-social engineering. Indeed, there are three main problems 
with this idea: (1) the logistical challenge in creating relationships of 
repeated interaction; (2) the general discomfort most people have with 
the idea of social engineering; and (3) the large-scale imposition of 
positive duties is an unacceptable encroachment upon individual lib-
erty. These problems need to be addressed even if they cannot be en-
tirely resolved. As to the first, the pre-existing relationship of the indi-
viduals between whom we wish to trigger customary ordering would 
have to be one that could be transformed into one of an ongoing, re-
peated nature. If it is logistically impossible to lock participants into 
relationships of repeated interaction, a customary law cultivation pol-
icy, no matter how ingenious, is simply not possible. This, however, is 
highly solvable. This could be done in most cases if the law is well-
targeted and thoughtfully crafted. As pointed out above, a lack of phys-
ical proximity is not necessarily an obstacle to creating such relation-
ships.110 
However, the second and third problems pose a far greater chal-
lenge. This is largely because the obstacles here are not structural; they 
are normative. Here we move from a descriptive account of cultivating 
customary law to a normative critique of the strategy. Indeed, we 
would be grossly remiss if we were to simply ignore the normative im-
plications of the present proposal. Social engineering of this kind just 
seems anathema to a liberal and democratic society. Indeed, the above 
 
 110.  See supra Part III.C.2. 
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example of forced lawn care conjures up chilling images of some dys-
topic Orwellian State. At best, such policies come across as offensively 
paternalistic.111 Yet this does not have to be the case. Indeed, Lessig, 
Sunstein, Kahan, and other legal scholars warm to the idea of using 
policy to shape social norms; contending that in a pluralistic society 
the risk of totalitarianism may be safely contained.112 In fact, in the last 
two decades there has been an explosion of interest in social norms 
within the legal academy,113 particularly in the possibility of “social 
norm management” as a regulatory tool. Moreover, we should appre-
ciate that it may not actually even be a matter of choice whether or not 
the State should shape informal social order. As some of these scholars 
point out, norm-shaping may be an inescapable consequence of law, 
something that occurs regardless of whether or not it is planned.114 
This being the case, it behooves us to approach the cultivation of cus-
tomary order in a reflective manner that allows for the positive maxi-
mization of the effect. In the end, the choice may be only whether or 
not to do it smartly. 
The third problem, however, may prove insurmountable. Even if 
we assume that ongoing positive duties can successfully trigger cus-
tomary law and can accept the goal of social engineering as legitimate, 
the large-scale imposition of positive duties upon individual members 
of the public runs directly counter to the fundamental notions of indi-
vidual freedom that undergird a liberal democratic society. It is diffi-
cult to get around this. The problem is that, compared with negative 
duties, positive legal impositions are far more restrictive of individual 
liberty in that they demand action to satisfy the duty.115 This is a di-
lemma, likely an insurmountable one if we are to maintain the current 
 
 111.  See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2035 
(1996) (discussing the view of norm-shaping as paternalistic). 
 112.  See Lessig, supra note 10; Sunstein, supra note 13; Kahan, supra note 10. See also Robert 
Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal Academy, SOCIAL NORMS 35, 
60 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001). But see POSNER, supra note 13 (cautioning 
against such approaches). 
 113.  Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
537, 542 (1998). 
 114.  See POSNER, supra note 13; Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 
U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996). 
 115.  TOUCHIE, supra note 46. 
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social and civic standards of our society. Indeed, this objection may 
prove fatal to the present project. Let us explore this final point in the 
context of existing law. 
Whatever benefits might be gleaned from fostering customary law, 
in a normative sense the trade-off is arguably too high.116 Traditional 
liberal individualist doctrine suggests that the gratuitous foisting of 
positive duties upon private citizens is an unacceptable assault upon 
individual freedom.117 Such arguments arise, for example, in relation 
to non-liability for omissions in Anglo-American criminal law.118 Ex-
plaining why we do not, for example, impose a duty to rescue someone 
in distress—why it is for instance perfectly legal for a man to watch a 
infant drown in a foot of bathwater and do nothing—one English jurist 
asserts, “In political terms it is less of an invasion of an individual’s 
freedom for the law to require him to consider the safety of others in 
his actions than to impose upon him a duty to rescue or protect.”119 
This principle of individual autonomy is also eminently clear in the 
case of, for example, specific performance in contract and mandatory 
injunctions in tort that require a party to perform an affirmative act or 
a specified course of conduct. Such injunctions are quite rare in prac-
tice and are granted not as a matter of right, but in the exercise of ju-
dicial discretion.120 The extreme reluctance of courts to award specific 
performance in circumstances where damages are a viable alternative 
underscores the hesitation with which the law views the idea of forcing 
an individual to perform an act rather than merely refraining from an 
act.121 Indeed, the law is far more comfortable telling people what they 
cannot do as opposed to what they must do. The individual’s right 
 
 116.  Not to mention the difficulty policy-wise in determining what is even to be considered 
as a worthy aim for which we should attempt to trigger customary law. 
 117.  Smith, supra note 41. 
 118.  JANE WRIGHT, TORT LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 129 (2001). Some common law 
jurisdictions make it a criminal offense not to give aid to those in peril when doing so could have 
been performed with no danger to oneself. These “good Samaritan” statutes have been enacted 
in some states in the United States. RICHARD G. SINGER & JOHN Q. LA FOND, CRIMINAL LAW 
41 (2010). I return to positive duties in relation to omissions below. 
 119.  Stovin v. Wise, [1996] A.C. 923, 943. 
 120.  Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481 (1925). 
 121.  JENNY STEELE, TORT LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 650 (2007); THOMAS 
KREBS, RESTITUTION AT THE CROSSROADS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 22 (2001). 
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against overburdensome state legal encroachment, in fact, informs the 
situations where positive duties are imposed upon the individual. With 
very few exceptions, in situations where positive duties do crop up the 
party subject to the duty has in a sense acquiesced to the arrangement 
that has given rise to the duty. 
The term consensual law is used in public international law to de-
scribe law voluntarily adopted by states, such as treaty obligations.122 
However, it can be used here in an analogous sense: to describe legal 
duties voluntarily assumed by private parties. Contract encapsulates 
consensual law. It is where it comes up most often and most clearly, 
yet consensual law arises in other areas of law as well. With regards to 
the instances where positive legal duties do arise in areas such as tort, 
property, family law, and criminal law, the law is unique in that the 
actors willingly open themselves up to the duty through their choice 
of actions, be this a duty of care, a fiduciary relationship, as a partici-
pant in a marriage, or even parenthood.123 One chooses to assume the 
role of a trustee, a doctor, an accountant, a business partner, a driver, 
a negligent manufacturer of ginger beer, a spouse, or a parent;124 it is 
not unilaterally foisted upon one by the State. People are not born into 
such social roles; they choose to adopt them. A duty of care, for in-
stance, arises in tort where an actor chooses to undertake an activity 
that may reasonably harm another.125 There are important political, 
social, policy, and even economic reasons why the State may conclude 
 
 122.  JAMES DAVID ARMSTRONG & JUTTA BRUNEE, ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 101 (2009). 
 123.  Though it should be noted here again that positive duties to others do not always 
imply that the actor must undertake a positive action of some kind; satisfying the duty may simply 
be a matter of refraining from an action. It may be, for instance, to refrain from giving unin-
formed financial advice. In this case it is not a positive duty to act; it is a negative duty to refrain 
from acting. See supra note 50. 
 124.  Although one could of course argue that the role of parent is sometimes not a volun-
tary commitment. Yet in most cases it is, at least in terms of the conduct that precipitates it. 
 125.  NICHOLAS J. MCBRIDE & RODERICK BAGSHAW, TORT LAW 59 (2008). Indeed, this 
notion of the actor voluntarily entering into the situation where a duty of care arises may be a 
useful analytic tool with which to better understand the special relationships that give rise to a 
duty of care. 
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that it is necessary to impose a positive duty.126 However, for our pur-
poses, in situations where the State does issue duties requiring positive 
action, it is notable that individuals have implicitly or even explicitly 
assented to it. Thus, arguably, the integrity of their individual liberty 
remains uncompromised. Such individuals have, through their very ac-
tions, consented to the positive duty—it is in this sense, consensual 
law. 
This is true even in the case of criminal law where positive duties 
to others are imposed in some instances—a voluntary strand can still 
be discerned. For example, the requirement that a parent must care for 
their child; contracts to provide personal care; the voluntary assump-
tion of care that isolates an individual; the creation of peril (e.g., push-
ing someone who cannot swim into a lake); the duty to control the 
conduct of another (e.g., as with an employer and her employee); the 
duty of a landowner (e.g., the duty for a store owner to provide safe 
conditions for her patrons).127 In all these cases, the party that assumes 
the positive duty does so as the result of their own voluntary actions, 
whether this be the parent, the nursing home, the reckless teenager 
pushing his friend into a lake, the businessman failing to stop his chauf-
fer from speeding, or the hotel owner failing to unlock the hotel’s fire 
exits. The element of voluntariness underlies all of these situations. 
This voluntary model is unmistakable in the law related to omissions 
where the primary justification for a duty to act is based upon the con-
ceptual framework of a contract.128 The juridical basis for the existence 
of a duty to act was historically the notion of a contract that “based 
 
 126.  For example, scholars point out that “the Industrial Revolution and the railways op-
erated as catalysts in the emergence of the tort of negligence.” PAUL WARD, IEL TORT LAW IN 
IRELAND 46 (2010). In the case of expanding the notion of a duty of care in tort the varied nature 
of these considerations is eminently clear. See CATHERINE ELLIOT, FRANCES QUINN, TORT 
LAW 18 (2007). 
 127.  SINGER & LA FOND, supra note 118, at 40. 
 128.  ALAN NORRIE, CRIME, REASON, AND HISTORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO 
CRIMINAL LAW 125 (2009). 
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liability on the individual’s prior consensual act.”129 Indeed, this con-
sensual model remains today a key conceptual foundation of the law of 
omissions,130 although its presence is sometimes obscured.131 
All of this bodes quite badly for the prospect of using positive legal 
duties to trigger customary law. The imposition of positive duties 
where these duties are not voluntarily adopted stands in contrast to the 
fundamental tenets that undergird a free society. Yet, that said, the im-
position of burdensome positive duties by government upon its citi-
zens is certainly not without precedent. For example, governments of-
ten mandate community service as a part of citizenship requirements 
or in lieu of military service. In times of war, positive duties are rou-
tinely foisted upon the public writ large (though not owed specifically 
to other private parties). Military conscription is of course the classic 
example. However, such duties have taken many forms. War-time re-
cycling discussed above is a good example. Another example of positive 
duties imposed upon the public on a truly massive scale is blackout 
regulations in Britain and along the U.S. eastern seaboard during 
WWII.132 Indeed, in times of national emergency, the sanctity placed 
upon the right of the individual not to have positive duties foisted upon 
her diminishes significantly. 
 
 129.  Id. This is clear, for example, in the case Instan [1893] 1 Q.B. 450, where the court 
held that a niece had a duty to care for her aunt based on the idea that she had implicitly volun-
tarily undertaken a contractual-like duty to look after her ailing aunt in return for her keep, alt-
hough in the strict sense no intention to create legal relations ever occurred. In Gibbins and Procter 
[1918] 13 Cr. App. R. 134 (Eng.), a duty was imposed upon a common law wife to care for her 
partner’s child because she had voluntarily assumed the duty when she chose to live with the 
child’s father. Similarly, in Stone and Dobinson [1977] Q.B. 354 (Eng.), an affirmative duty was 
imposed upon a couple to care for the boyfriend’s sister because they had consented to take her 
in. 
 130.  NORRIE, supra note 128. 
 131.  A good example of this obscuring would be the case of Miller [1982] UKHL 6, where 
a squatter accidentally set fire to an abandoned house then chose to not douse the flames. The 
court “discovered” a new legal duty at common law related to not rectifying accidents that oneself 
has created where one can easily do so. I submit, the court groped its way to this convoluted duty 
because the consensual nature underlying the case was obscured by the fact that the fire was set 
accidentally; nevertheless, the squatter assumed a duty to act when he voluntarily chose to squat 
in the house. That the fire was set accidentally was incidental. That the squatter voluntarily en-
tered into the situation (squatting in the house) gives rise to the intuitive feeling that the defend-
ant should bear some positive duty to act. 
 132.  DAVID E. NYE, WHEN THE LIGHTS WENT OUT: A HISTORY OF BLACKOUTS IN 
AMERICA 37–66 (2010). 
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Yet, in the final analysis, radical socio-legal engineering crafted to 
exploit the self-generating properties of ongoing positive duties by in-
creasing the number of such duties between private parties would most 
likely be viewed by most as simply an unacceptable assault upon indi-
vidual liberty and for this reason alone is probably not feasible. The 
extent to which the State can unilaterally impose positive duties is pro-
foundly limited by the concept of individual liberty, which stands as a 
bedrock principle of modern western society. This is clearly reflected 
in our law. It is a well-entrenched principle in our law and social ethos 
that the State may reasonably impose such duties only within the con-
fined boundaries of consent, and because of this, customary law culti-
vation as a child of policy would likely not sit well with our sense of 
social equity. 
IV. Conclusion 
This paper posited a somewhat radical idea: by creating positive 
duties between individuals government can trigger the emergence of 
customary law in a controlled manner. While the idea involves a cer-
tain degree of theoretical complexity, at its heart it is in fact a simple 
and intuitive point: the more parties repeatedly interact the greater is 
the potential that a stable cooperative order will emerge that will give 
rise to customary rules. Thus a way to trigger customary law is simply 
to create conditions that allow for repeated interaction. Such an ap-
proach, if viable, would be a particularly powerful legislative tool. Har-
nessing the energy of bottom-up order holds great promise in terms of 
creating, sustaining, and even redirecting social order. Whether or not 
this strategy can be successfully implemented ultimately remains an 
open question, one subject to the experiment of actual application. 
Short of this, its viability is difficult to assess. Yet beyond the issue of 
mere technical feasibility, there are serious normative implications that 
would need to be carefully weighed. While this kind of socio-legal en-
gineering may prove technically possible, the idea cannot help but 
leave a morally unpalatable taste in the mouth, and as such it is difficult 
to see how such policies could ever be casually undertaken. Neverthe-
less, while it may suffer from some fundamental limitations (at least in 
the normative realm), given the many advantages of customary law 
over that of formal top-down law, it is an attractive concept. As for the 
DRUZIN.FINAL (UPDATED 6.11) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2014 8:04 PM 
373] Planting Seeds of Order  
413 
 
normative implications of such a policy, I leave that for others to con-
sider for themselves with respect to their own moral intuitions. 
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